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About the MIT Japan Program 
and its Working Paper Series 
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 198 1 to create a new generation 
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and 
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well 
as support from the government and frbm private foundations, have made 
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of 
applied Japanese studies in the world. 
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research 
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to 
ssues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations 
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to 
make use of MTTs extensive network of Japan-related resources, which 
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo- 
based ofice. Through its three core activities, namely, education, 
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its 
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science 
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed. 
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important 
means to achieving these ends. 
I.  THE GAME 
The second biannual Asia-Pacific Political Crisis Simulation was held at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology on 5-7 May 1995. The exercise brought together scholars and 
practitioners from seven nations in the region, and was the culmination of a graduate seminar 
entitled "Japan and the New World Order" taught by Professor Richard J. Samuels, Head of the 
MIT Department of Political Science and Director of the MIT Japan Program. 
The principal goal of this exercise was to examine Japan's hture international role in light 
of recent domestic, regional, and global changes and to trace possible paths along which this role 
might develop. In addition, carell attention was paid to the foreign policy choices and domestic 
political dynamics in China, Korea, and the United States. The time frame under study was 1998 
to 20 10. Participants were assigned to teams representing constituencies and leaders from a 
number of regional actors including Japan, the United States, the People's Republic of China, (a 
unified) Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Australia. 
Through role playing and negotiations, each team developed national plans and policies 
over the course of three four-year "moves." A central control team guided the game and played 
the role of countries, regions, and other actors not represented by an independent team. Principal 
players, drawn fiom among former government officials, business executives, and academics, 
were assigned roles as key policy makers of each of the country teams. MIT graduate students 
enrolled in the seminar served as "aides-de-camp" for the game's principal players. Japanese 
citizens residing in the Cambridge area played the role of a "Japanese public," and voted in three 
national elections and one constitutionai referendum during the twelve year period. 
L[, W A T  HAPPENED? 
The game began in a fictional 1998 by two major crises for the region and 
especially for Japanese foreign policy. It is imporfant to note that the baseline and crisis 
scenarios developed for the game were entire& jictional and were intended solely for the 
educational use of MIT students and the participans in the M?T Asian Political Crisis 
Simulation. 
The first crisis concerned a revolt underway in Indonesia. Under this first "baseline 
scenario," a findamentalist Islamic revolution erupted in Indonesia after months of tensions. 
Revolutionaries targeted Japan and Japanese businesses as scapegoats for a number of social and 
economic problems. They presented Japan directly with several thorny policy problems, 
including: a) Taking a number of Japanese citizens hostage, b) Threatening to cut off Japanese 
supplies of vital raw materials and fbels, and c) Possible nationalization of Japanese assets. The 
Japanese government had to decide whether or not to support the remaining elements of the 
Indonesian government or to placate the rebels- either way without the open and effective 
support of the United States. 
The second crisis concerned Korean refugees seeking asylum in Japan. In this "baseline 
scenario," the economic collapse of the DPRK in 1997 led to the reunification of Korea, and 
Japan was faced with two difficult issues: a) More than one hundred thousand Korean refigees, 
many with relatives living in Japan, were fleeing a difficult economic situation on the Peninsula 
and were heading toward Honshu. In addition, a few thousand political and military leaders of the 
former DPRK also sought refuge in Japan. Moreover, b) Seoul discovered a small number of 
nuclear devices left by the former DPRK. 
The game also posited a United States that faced severe budgetary constraints imposed by 
a "Balanced Budget Amendment" and a highly isolationist populace. While its nominal 
commitment to Japan (and Western Europe) remained intact, its ability to project military power 
had declined dramatically by 1998, the start of the game. The situation in Eastern Europe, 
combined with a nationalist Russia, was designed to distract U.S. strategists. In general, a 
conservative, isolationist Congress and the election of an economics-minded President contributed 
to a domestically focused American government. 
Finally, China was modeled as potentially fragmented, subject to the centrifugal forces of 
regionalism and popular unrest. 
IIA THE MAJOR CMSES 
Twelve years of domestic political dynamics, included the replacement of one ~rnerican 
president and of two Japanese Prime Ministers, the creation of two new Japanese political parties, 
and two coups d'etat in China (resulting finally in martial law). During this same period, each 
team was forced to focus on and grapple with five major foreign policy problems. Two of these 
problems were resolved early and rather convincingly. A third was partially solved, while two 
others proved intractable. These were: 
1. Korean refigees 
The Japanese team, with US help, quickly found an effective solution to the Korean 
refugee problem, by providing large sums of money to Korea to assist refbgee repatriation. Japan 
also asked the Korean navy to halt the refbgee flow as the price for this aid,. Despite the 
persistence of small numbers of refbgees in Japanese camps, and despite the best efforts of some 
within Japan (both Japanese citizens and Korean residents) to force the government to accept 
Korean refbgees into Japanese society, none were resettled permanently on Japanese soil. 
2. The Korean bomb 
The Korean team quickly conceded on the problem of orphaned North Korean nuclear 
weapons, offering to dismantle them without hesitation. Despite initial IAEA doubts about the 
transparency of this response, Korea's neighbors seemed satisfied and the problem melted away. 
3. Indonesian Revolution and Hostage Seizure 
The Japan team could not solve the hostage crisis. While the Japanese government 
deliberated, several hostages were executed. In an effort to boost his chances for election as 
Prime Minister, one Japanese opposition party leader tried unsuccessfblly to buy the release of the 
Japanese hostages for $50 million in exchange for being able to take credit as their liberator. He 
failed, and although he later became Prime Minister, he fell From power after news of his secret 
effort led to Diet hearings. The Taiwanese secured the release of the surviving Japanese hostages, 
earning the gratitude of the Japanese public and significant economic rewards from the new 
Indonesian government. $20 billion in Japanese assets were transferred to Taiwanese control. 
4. Indonesian Muslim Expansionism and Threats to the Sea Lanes 
The rebels seized power easily, due in part to the Japanese government's unwillingness to 
support the Indonesian government and defend its economic interests there. The new Islamic 
Republic quickly proclaimed jurisdiction over a "Green Crescent" that included the southern 
Philippines, Malaysia, the Spratley Islands and the sea lanes adjacent to those locations. Regional 
efforts to contain this expansionism showed mixed results. ASEAN, under Malaysian leadership 
tried, but failed to create a credible military deterrent to Indonesian expansion. The Japanese 
dispatched warships to Indonesian waters in order to protect their interests. However, this 
engendered significant opposition at home and abroad. The Japanese government was forced to 
withdraw temporarily and was unable to take these kinds of measures again until Article Nine of 
the Japanese Constitution was revised to accommodate this significant de facto shift in Japanese 
defense policy. 
A Japan-led, anti-Indonesian defensive alliance called the "Joint Organization of Defense 
by Asian Nations" (JODAN) was one answer to Indonesian expansion. It failed due to the lack of 
support among nations in the region. The United States, moved to retain leadership in the region 
despite its limited resources and formed an "Unoffensive Security Organization7' (USO) that 
received broad support. Despite China's catcalls from the sidelines, this seemed effective. 
However, US0 could not avert or reverse Indonesia's Serb-style stirring of Muslim rebellion in 
Asia. Mindanao fell away from the control of the Philippine Government, and Malaysia was close 
to collapse by the end of the game. Indonesia made gains, and neither JODAN nor US0 offered a 
klly effective response. 
5. Third World Bombmaking. Bombwaving & Bombselling 
Indonesian manufacture and export of nuclear weapons was largely unsolved. Control's 
assumption that U.S. air strikes would work was, in retrospect, optimistic. More likely, a large 
invasion was probably necessary, with sizable US, Japanese, and US0 losses. This would 
certainly be harder to sell to the American people in the real world than it was in the game. In the 
end, then, no answer short of force was found for the Indonesian nuclear program, and force was, 
as always, a poor answer. 
W. THE MAJOR TEAMS 
1. Japan 
As noted above, between 1998-20 10 Japan grew markedly more assertive than in 1995. 
Japan reacted to threats to its interest by mobilizing its own military and political resources when 
compelled by circumstances. It acted militarily outside a peacekeeping format when it deployed 
warships to Indonesian waters. Even before revising its "war renouncing7' Constitution, Japan 
acquired long-range blue water naval forces and amphibious forces, and it attempted to assume 
regional leadership through formation of JODAN. The reason for this Japanese assertiveness lay 
clearly in the rising tide of threats to Japanese interests. But, Japan ultimately foresaw the 
"security dilemma" consequences of its new assertiveness, e.g. the risk of scaring Korea and 
China by its anti-Indonesian build-up and deployment measures, and it wisely took steps to 
reassure both neighboring powers. Nonetheless, by the last round, China and Korea had found 
common cause in balancing against resurgent Japanese power. 
Although external challenges caused political turmoil and turbulence in Japan, with each 
cycle of elections and realignment, the Japanese leadership became more active on the world 
stage. Between 1998-2002, a great many conventional impe irnents to autonomous Japanese 
foreign policy were evident on the Japanese side, including differences between the conservative 
and progressive parties, dependence on the United States, bureaucratic inertia, and policy 
discussions short on specifics. Over time, however, domestic impediments to independent 
Japanese foreign policy were overcome. For a short time after 2002, the Shinshinto won public 
support and demonstrated an ability to lead a conservative governing coalition. 
In foreign affairs, the Shinshinto government repeatedly stressed within the Cabinet Room 
that Japan must make security policy decisions unilaterally, and then explain its decisions to the 
United States. Thus, despite the Japanese government's public insistence on the importance of 
the US-Japan alliance, the government was not driven by an imperative to secure U.S. support for 
its initiatives abroad. In addition, while there were formal consultations with neighboring states, 
the new govennment did not thoroughly discuss and debate reactions to its new assertiveness in 
the rest of Asia. It should not have been a surprise, then, that anxious Korea shifted away from 
Japan and towards China. 
The replacement of the Shinshinto government by a broader coalition in 2007 brought 
together an effective crisis management team. But, this confounded the Japanese public, which 
felt that it had once again lost the voice of organized opposition in the democratic polity. The 
public grew disaffected with the machinations of politicians and with their willingness to make 
deals without thorough consultation and public debate. 
From the perspective of 1995, the option of such a grand coalition is pregnant with 
possibilities for a fhture Japanese response to regional or global crises. In a sense it is also a 
throwback to the 1930s. This time, however, the grand coalition politicians sontrolled the 
bureaucrats. The demise of the Socialists and the rise of an alternative Citizens' Party helped to 
consolidate a consensus that enabled Japan to act rapidly and effectively. The new government 
corrected for the earlier unilateralism and replaced it with an approach that combined a proactive 
security role in the US-Japan alliance and greater cooperation and consultations with Asian 
countries. 
There was no support for a reorientation of Japan's economic policy orientation despite 
U.S. pressure. The government's judgment, which proved correct, was that the United States 
would ultimately disregard economic issues because of their perception of acute security 
challenges in the region. 
The Japanese public made a great difference by asking sensible, yet irritating questions of 
the politicians. Once the grand coalition was formed and the public perceived that they had been 
betrayed by politicians who ignored their views, they formed their own grass-roots party, and a 
new political confrontation was brewing as the simulation ended. 
2. China 
China pursued parochial policies that betrayed a great-power-outsider attitude. Aloof 
from the common problems of Asia, the Chinese made little effort to help solve them in a 
cooperative manner. 
Despite efforts to maintain a centralized Chinese state, foreign policy crises caused severe 
political turmoil in China. The Chinese leadership was humiliated by Taiwan's success in 
Indonesia, and as a direct consequence, the head of the Chinese Communist Party fell victim to a 
coup d'etat. The Chinese team presented this coup to world opinion as a matter of "democratic 
centralism." Later, a weak Chinese response to U.S. military initiatives in the region was used as 
a pretext by some Politburo members to strengthen their hand vis-his the PLA by staging 
demonstrations in Beijing and other major cities. This attempt backfired, however, and the 
military seized control, crushing popular opposition. This time the tanks did not stop at the gates 
of Zhongnanhai, and martial law was declared. The majority of the Politburo, including its most 
progressive elements, was purged and arrested. 
China found itself trapped in a downward spiral of misperception. China was perceived as 
more aggressive than its actions warranted. Perceptions of Chinese expansionist designs 
provided a pretext for China's neighbors to exclude it from evolving regional security 
arrangements, and China found itself isolated. These rnisperceptions remained uncorrected, as 
China repeatedly forswore opportunities to increase its influence in the region through confidence 
building measures. Despite its engorged resources, China failed to assume a leadership role. 
10 
3. The United States 
Throughout the period 1998-20 10, the United States remained committed to Asian 
regional security and, despite the Soviet demise, remained active in the region. The US 
repeatedly reaffirmed the US-Japan alliance and refbsed adamantly to link Japanese trade and 
economic problems to its political and military concerns. The United States neither questioned 
its Cold War security and trade commitments, nor did it ever articulate a "grand strategy" 
commensurate with the political and economic challenges of the "New World Order." Typical of 
its past proclivities-- the United States continued to act unilaterally, albeit after limited 
consultations with Korea and Japan. The U.S. seemed to be "in denial" regarding the need to 
make tradeoffs in a post-Cold War era of limited resources and domestic political pressures. 
Despite Control's best efforts to highlight the limits of U.S. capabilities, Washington ignored its 
relative economic decline and continued to project force unilaterally without regard for public 
opinion. 
In short, some states were better able to cope with the "New World Disorder" than were 
others. Some, such as Japan and China, succeeded in simultaneously pursuing short and long- 
term interests. Others, like the United States, were unable to redress the strategic imbalance in 
the construction of their foreign policies. In particular, the U.S. team sacrificed long term 
economic interests in order to sustain a leadership role in regional political military affairs. Japan, 
which entered the game as "an economic giant and a political pygmy," became a "normal nation," 
with the capability to unilaterally commit military forces to defend its interests. The long-term 
rise of china, the biggest story in Asia (and perhaps the world), is an event for which states 
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should have been preparing. Although East Asia's regional status quo powers did join in concert 
to contain one aggressor's expansion, China's rise went unremarked upon and unprepared for. 
V. THE MAJOR LESSONS 
- .- 
1.  International Institutions Matter. Sometimes in Unexpected Ways 
Throughout the simulation, US.  decisions were informed by Cold War-era alliance 
commitments-- even though the original precipitant of these alliances (a Soviet threat) was long 
gone. U.S. policy makers repeatedly asked "What are we committed to do, and for whom?" 
They then did what they were committed to do, and they were leery of doing more. In short, an 
institution (the Cold War alliance network) persisted and conditioned U.S. conduct long after the 
conditions that produced it had disappeared. Similarly, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) served as the central forum for coordinating a regional response to security 
crises, despite its original charter limiting its role to trade and economic issues. We observe that 
institutions live longer than the conditions that created them, and that they may evolve to meet 
new needs. 
2. East Asia is Institution-Poor 
East Asia is not endowed with robust security institutions. During the twelve year period 
1998-20 10, Japan and the U. S. had to improvise a collective response to Indonesian aggression 
and bomb-waving. This process took time and was pursued unevenly, e.g. JODAN first, then 
USO. China remains outside even the most nascent multilateral organizations. Similarly, Japan's 
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leadership is inhibited by the general distrust of neighboring states. In Europe, by contrast, the 
major status quo powers would have used NATO, WEU, or CSCE to initiate a collective 
response to similar security crises. The case of Bosnia, of course, instructs us that the availability 
of such institutions cannot guarantee the successfi.d resolution of all crises. Nonetheless, the Asia- 
Pacific region can only benefit from a thicker network of international institutions. 
3. Power is Balanced 
Even in East Asia, a region largely unprepared to deal with a regional aggressor, the 
balance of power dynamics operated. Regional states moved to contain Indonesian expansion. 
However, the several coalitions formed in response to Indonesian power could not contain 
Indonesia's expansion into Muslim areas abroad (part of southern Philippines & Malaysia). As 
noted above, China remained apart From these efforts. 
Also, each time Japan enhanced its military capabilities in order to confront threats to its 
citizens and economic interests abroad, alarms went off in China and Korea. This led to a series 
of discussions between these continental states and, ultimately, to a tacit understanding that 
Japanese power ought to be balanced. 
4. Successful Crisis Mana~ement Requires Preparation. but Preparation Does not Guarantee 
Success 
Japan and the United States quickly solved one problem that their strategists had long 
thought about, e.g. the Korean crises, but they (and other states) failed to solve unanticipated 
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crises, such as Indonesian expansionism. Unfortunately, the problems associated with nuclear 
4 
arms proliferation which have been the object of exhaustive study for decades, proved intractable. 
Important potential crises that loom on the horizon, such as China's military build-up, were left 
unaddressed altogether. 
.-- 
5. There is no Easv Solution to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Three points emerge here: 
a. WMD proliferation alarmed nearly every player. Realist arguments for the 
benefits of nuclear proliferation- viz., that their diffision is a stabilizing a factor in 
world politics-- found few adherents in this game. 
b. Neither great nor medium powers found easy answers to Indonesian 
bombmaking and bombselling. This reflects the absence of easy answers to such 
problems. There are none, short of accepting the spread of WMD and relying on 
deterrence to prevent WMD use. 
c. Technologically advanced countries, when faced with aggressive nuclear armed 
neighbors without a credible external security guarantee, will feel pressure to 
acquire nuclear weapons. By 2008, Australia had withdrawn from the nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty when it became clear that its defense partners could not 
protect it from an implacably aggressive Indonesian neighbor. 
6.  Domestic Politics Matters (Second Ima-geJ 
Domestic politics affects foreign policy decisions: 
a. Before the Japanese government could undertake effective unilateral action 
abroad, politicians had to placate public opinion which had become distrust£bl and 
alienated. In fact, public opinion was remarkably influential b~ all the democratic 
states. 
b. Japan's ability to act was sharply constrained by its inability to reach decisions. 
The Japanese government found many international changes hard to cope with, 
because policy adjustments required decisions, and in Japan decisions required 
consensus which was difficult to achieve. 
c. The U.S. govemment was pushed to make quick decisions by the press and 
public opinion. The Democratic President (1998-2002) moved deliberately and 
refbsed to let decisions be driven by premature commitments made in response to 
public opinion. He was roundly defeated in the next election and demoted to a 
role as House Minority Leader. His Republican successor played to the press and 
public opinion more effectively, but at the expense of deliberate and consistent US 
policy. In neither case did the United States ever articulate its national interests or 
its grand strategy. 
d. In China leaders were forced to act so as to accommodate historically 
motivated, popular concerns about China's sovereignty and independence. 
7. Global Events have Domestic Ramifications (Second Image Reversed) 
While domestic politics may constrain foreign policy options, the mare dramatic lesson is 
that global events may cause major structural changes in the dynamics of domestic politics. 
a. In China, inadequate responses to crises in the Asia-Pacific region led directly 
to two coups d'etat that ultimately delivered power to conservative military 
leaders. Chinese power was "reengineered" by foreign events. 
b. In Japan, foreign crises led to demands by Japanese citizens for greater political 
accountability. The government was forced to bring its constitution into line with 
its de facto Glitary program. 
8. The "Nixon to China" Effect 
Major policy shifts may require those groups traditionally associated with the status quo to 
assume leadership in initiating change. We observe that when "hard-line" opponents of change 
soften their position and actively advocate reform, change can be both complete and enduring. 
For example, successfid constitutional revision required leadership by the remnants of the Japan 
Socialist Party on this issue. Traditional conservatives could not have achieved such a dramatic 
change alone. 
